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The crisis in the provision of legal services to poor people has a long
history. As with many longstanding social ills-urban sprawl, disinte-
grating public schools, poverty in general-the persistence of the prob-
lem tends to reduce it to subliminal status, despite angst-laden bar meet-
ings, scholarly articles espousing new and innovative approaches, and
cycles of warnings and complaints from poverty lawyers. What is beyond
challenge, however, is that the gap between the needs of poor clients and
lawyers to meet these needs is large and growing larger.!
The explanation for the most recent stage of the crisis is the virtual
demise of federal funding for legal services. For fiscal year 1996, Con-
gress reduced funding for the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) by thirty
percent, continuing a series of major reductions and advocacy restrictions
that have severely undermined the ability of legal services lawyers to
serve their clients.2 While it is true that legal services programs had been
forced to accept restrictions in past years, new controls prohibiting LSC
grantees from using non-LSC resources to engage in class action suits,
lobbying, and litigation against a federal or state welfare system3 have de-
creased advocacy to the poor from a steady stream to a trickle.
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1. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS ON NONLAWYER
ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS 79-80 (1995) ("Based upon the findings from numerous
legal needs surveys, state bar reports, and the weight of its witnesses' testimony, the commission
finds that when the nation is viewed as a whole, there are currently insufficient sources of afford-
able legal help for all low- and moderate-income persons, and that the needs of a large number of
such persons are currently unmet."); see also, e.g., STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN, COMMISSION ON
THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (1996) (noting
quantifiable unmet need for the delivery of legal services); COMMISSION ON THE FUrURE OF THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS, JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, at 64 (1993) (reporting that "only 15.2 per-
cent of the legal needs of the poor were met in 1990"); Victor Marrero, Committee to Improve the
Availability of Legal Services: Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 755 (1991) (reporting that "[t]he scope and dimensions of the crisis of poverty
and the gap between legal needs and legal services associated with them are matters of common
experience and are confirmed by information, studies, documentation and statistical evidence that
put the size and importance of the crisis beyond reasonable doubts").
2. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act (OCRAA), Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
3. See Recent Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1346, 1346-47 (1997) (citing OCRAA §§
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In Vermont, for example, the LSC cuts mean that the number of eli-
gible clients who receive direct representation is so diminished as to be
almost nonexistent. Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., a statewide program for-
merly funded by LSC, no longer takes LSC funding because of the re-
strictions. It is operating at a greatly reduced level and takes cases only
on an emergency basis.4 A new LSC-funded program, Legal Services Law
Line, operates a "hot line" staffed by lawyers who provide advice, refer-
ral, and pro se materials to hundreds of callers with the familiar legal
problems of the poor: evictions, divorce, custody, guardianship, child
support, consumer frauds, and benefits problems. Callers take the advice
and materials and represent themselves in court or before administrative
agencies.
In addition to the efforts of full-time legal aid attorneys, many private
attorneys in Vermont work for the poor in a pro bono capacity. But this
resource also cannot meet the need. By LSC directive, Law Line must
work in conjunction with a program utilizing the pro bono services of
private attorneys! Vermont Volunteer Lawyers Project is a pro bono
program that picks up a small percentage of the cases that need counsel,
but not nearly enough lawyers participate to make even a small dent in
the problem. Vermont is not atypical in this respect.
6
There is little doubt that the problem of providing legal services to the
poor is severe, but there is no agreement on what to do about it. Most
proposals look to familiar faces for the answers-the private bar and the
courts, or Congress and state governments. While it will always be essen-
tial to press the private bar and legislative bodies for more services and
funding, that effort will never provide more than a partial answer to a
growing problem.
It is my belief that the situation will not be remedied unless it is at-
tacked as part of a broader problem of access to the justice system. It is
not just the poor who cannot afford justice in today's society. Courts
across the country have experienced an explosion in pro se litigation,7
504(d)(1), 504(a)(16)).
4. One of the current features of legal services funding is that it is easier to find funding for
specific groups, such as the elderly and disabled, or victims of domestic violence, producing a kind
of "boutique" legal services. Funding is less available for general service work, which may be what
low-income clients need most.
5. See 45 C.F.R. § 1614.1a (1998) (requiring that an LSC grantee devote 12.5% of funds to in-
volving private attorneys in a pro bono capacity).
6. See Marrero, supra note 1, at 824 (noting that, despite efforts of bar associations, only about
10% of attorneys in New York engage in pro bono work for the poor); Michael Millemann, Man-
datory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18, 58
(1990) (noting that voluntary programs in Maryland are not meeting needs of the poor).
7. Prose litigants are appearing with increasing frequency, not just in courts of limited jurisdic-
tion but also in courts of general jurisdiction. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MEETING
THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION 8 (1998). There has been a particularly dramatic increase
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and many people representing themselves are of moderate income levels
and would not be eligible for publicly funded legal services or pro bono
services even under the most generous standards that have been em-
ployed. Our long-term strategy must move beyond throwing more law-
yers at the problem. Instead, we must develop a new approach to doing
the traditional business of the courts that will meet the needs of diverse
economic groups. Such an approach should not only utilize scarce re-
sources more efficiently, but it also should serve a substantially greater
population, and thus be more likely to enjoy broad and continuing politi-
cal support.
I. WHY THE OLD SOLUTIONS WILL NOT WORK
Relying on pro bono services of attorneys and federally funded legal
services programs will not enable us to provide meaningful access to an
overloaded justice system. The seemingly endless debate within the bar
about the nature of the lawyer's professional obligation to provide pro
bono services has succeeded only in delaying real resolution of the issue.
In the meantime, the answer to the question, "Why should attorneys do
pro bono?" has become increasingly irrelevant. Focusing only on ways to
revive and reorganize legal services programs is also a strategic error in
that it treats access to justice as a discrete problem of the poor, rather
than of society in general.
Historically, the dominant view has been that the pro bono services of
a lawyer are an act of charity, compelled by the lawyer's individual con-
science,8 or, more recently, by codes of professional conduct. The organ-
ized bar has not been able to agree on any form of compulsion to in-
crease the level of pro bono activity. Rule 6.1 of the ABA's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct sets forth only an aspirational goal: at least 50
hours of pro bono legal services a year, with a substantial majority of the
legal services to be rendered to people of limited means or other groups
without resources for legal fees. Some states now require mandatory re-
porting of pro bono activities,9 but the obligation to serve remains volun-
tary in every state.
in domestic relations courts. See id. Lower-income people are more likely to represent themselves,
see id. at 11-12, but data from studies in various jurisdictions indicates that there is no typical profile
of a pro se litigant, see id. at 13. Some jurisdictions have witnessed marked increases in self-
representation by middle income persons. See id. at 12.
8. See Tigran W. Eldred, The Lawyer's Duty of Public Service: More Than Charity?, 96 NV. VA.
L. REv. 367,374 & n. 26 (1994).
9. See, e.g., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, R. 4-6.1(d) (Florida Bar Association 1998)
(requiring members of the Florida bar to annually report whether the member has satisfied the
member's professional responsibility to provide pro bono legal services to the poor).
Yale Law & Policy Review
Proponents of mandatory pro bono argue that a legal and enforceable
duty may be found in the ethical norms governing the legal profession,
especially in light of the present crisis. They buttress their argument for
obligatory pro bono with various theories grounded in the notions that
lawyers have a monopoly on the justice system and that "meaningful ac-
cess to the legal system requires the assistance of a lawyer."1" Accord-
ingly, asking lawyers to spend a certain percentage of their time on pro
bono work is a "fair surcharge for the windfall that accrues from a legal
monopoly."'" In a variation on the monopoly theme, some have argued
that mandatory pro bono is similar to an in-kind user fee, which should
be paid by lawyers for the exclusive right to use certain public assets, such
as evidentiary privileges, conflict of interest rules, and the work product
doctrine. On the other side of the argument, a number of commentators
refute the monopoly theory and oppose mandatory pro bono on the
ground that the burden of distributing legal services to the poor should
be borne by society as a whole, not by individual lawyers. 3
It is not surprising that these theories have not yielded measurable
changes in attitudes or in hours of pro bono services. Ethical norms do
not vary in response to ebbs and flows in demand for legal services. Pro-
fessional standards may change gradually over time, but they are essen-
tially independent of transient factors like shifts in the economy and in
political fortunes. Even if new theories were taken seriously, it would be
unrealistic to expect an enforceable legal duty to provide pro bono serv-
ices to match cyclical changes in need.
Pursuant to their regulatory control of lawyers, the courts could, of
course, give more teeth to Rule 6.1 by making it mandatory. But I sus-
pect most state courts will not want to assume of the role of "pro bono
cop." Judges are far more willing to encourage lawyers, through volun-
tary programs, to assist the courts by providing more service to poor cli-
ents. More importantly, even if the courts were willing to resolve the
moral-obligation-versus-professional-duty debate in favor of mandatory
pro bono, the present aspirational goal of 50 hours per year would fall far
short of solving the needs of the poor given the current crisis.
10. See Eldred, supra note 8, at 395.
11. Id. at 398.
12. See Steven Lubert & Cathryn Stewart, A "Public Assets" Theory of Lawyers' Pro Bono
Obligations, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1245,1262-85 (1997).
13. See Eldred, supra note 8, at 397-98 (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERING AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY 246 (1988) ("[lIt is unfortunate that poor people cannot obtain lawyers, but that is
not the fault of the legal system."); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 1060, 1079-80 (1976) ("If the obligation [to serve the
poor] is one of justice, then it is an obligation of society as a whole. It is cheap and hypocritical for
society to be unwilling to pay the necessary lawyers from the tax revenues of all, and then to claim
that individual lawyers are morally at fault for not choosing to work for free.")).
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Even voluntary pro bono is a hard sell in this economic climate. In-
creased competition among law firms and the demand for billable hours
has reduced opportunities for lawyers to engage in "pro bono service,
civic involvement, and experiences that build professional judgment and
sustain a professional culture." 14 Under these conditions, debating
"oughts" that are neither enforceable institutionally nor accountable to
the marketplace is at best ineffectual and at worst counterproductive.
Engaging in this conversation may create the illusion that salvation will
follow soon after logic prevails and truth-based advocacy triumphs.
The old solutions also will not work because they assume that the en-
tire subject is best left to the legal profession and the courts. The creation
of the Legal Services Corporation may have been a high point in public
attention to the legal service needs of the poor; it now appears to have
been an exception to the prevailing rule. As important as the program
was, it relied heavily on the assumption that the legal profession would
remain the core service provider and that the courts would remain the
central forum for resolution of disputes. In the days when LSC grantees
were allowed to engage in lobbying, legislative initiatives successfully se-
cured broad-scale relief for low-income clients through policy changes in
welfare and other programs affecting them. But it is fair to say that the
main focus was, and still is, on providing adequate services within the ex-
isting judicial system rather than on changing that system. In the absence
of systemic changes that would lessen dependency on funded legal serv-
ices, the Legal Services Corporation was politically at risk from the mo-
ment of its creation. The lesson is that stable and comprehensive solu-
tions should not center on any one politically sensitive program, however
enlightened in concept and effective in practice it is while it operates.
Realistically, Congress is not likely to reverse the anti-legal services
trend begun in the Reagan years. Nor are states prepared to make up the
difference. The parallel federal and state focus on welfare reform, though
distinct from the pro bono debate, creates an atmosphere in which resto-
ration of former levels of funding, either from Congress or state legisla-
tures, is extremely unlikely.
Finally, focusing on reviving legal services is problematic because it
treats the poor as isolated constituents with unique difficulties, thereby
masking the connection between their problems and those of other liti-
gants, and obscuring the ways in which the access problem stems from
failures in the system's design.
14. Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283,299-300
(1998).
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II. A NEW DIRECTION
The difficulty poor clients experience in their efforts to access justice
should be seen as the canary in the coal mine for the justice system as a
whole-the poor are affected first because they are more vulnerable, but
their difficulties are symptomatic of larger problems that ultimately will
affect everyone. Although people of limited means may suffer most
acutely from lack of representation, their experience is not an anomaly in
an otherwise optimal relationship between society and the legal profes-
sion. As I have noted, people of moderate means lack representation for
the same reasons as do the poor: because they cannot afford the legal
fees." An effective long-term strategy cannot rely solely on reviving legal
services for the poor, but must develop approaches that will enhance ac-
cess to justice for a wider public. There are achievable structural changes
that will make the legal system more efficient for its users. Additionally,
in the current political climate, legislators and policy makers will be more
receptive to funding structural reforms that benefit all users rather than a
single sector.
There is no shortage of ideas for ways to reform the legal system.6
The critical question is which ideas hold the most promise for a large
number of litigants and for the institutions of justice, and thus are more
likely to be accepted and actually implemented. From the standpoint of
solving the access problems of indigent clients, some solutions worth con-
sidering include altering the lawyer's monopoly on the justice system and
demystifying the law so that lay people can understand it. It is also ap-
propriate to question whether court adjudication, with its attendant em-
phasis on legal formality, is always the most appropriate method of dis-
pute resolution, either procedurally or substantively.
17
Critical to any scheme for improving access to justice is a recognition
that the monopoly lawyers hold on the justice system has become an un-
acceptable barrier to change. The increasing use of paralegals has proven
that many legal matters, especially those that rely on forms, may be han-
dled quite competently by non-lawyers, with little or no actual supervi-
15. See Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Service to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 531, n. 28 ("cost is the second most-frequent reason given for not consulting a lawyer")
(citing Barbara A. Curran, Report on the 1989 Survey of the Public's Use of Legal Services, in TWVO
NATIONWIDE SURvEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENT OF THE POOR & PuBLIc GENERALLY 55 (ABA
Consortium on Legal Services for the Public, 1989)).
16. See Cramton, supra note 15, at 532 (reciting long history of commentators expressing
widely held views that legal system is grossly inefficient and suggesting various avenues of reform).
17. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5 (1996) (arguing that many conflicts cannot be re-
duced to binary solutions because of fundamental indeterminacy of facts, irreconcilability of legal
entitlements, or equal validity of competing emotional claims in certain cases).
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sion by a person admitted to the bar.18 Lawyers in candid moments will
admit this, but the organized bar has kept a firm grip on rules relating to
paralegals and the unauthorized practice of law.'9 The consistent ration-
ale is that consumers need protection against their own ignorance, and
that only by regulating lawyers will the public be protected from the un-
scrupulous. 0 But lawyers have made themselves a scarce resource, and it
is difficult to sustain the argument that the poor are being protected by
not receiving any legal advice at all.21 For clients who are poor, unedu-
cated and powerless, and who may have language and cultural barriers
that distance them even farther from access to justice, an adviser with a
limited range of skills or knowledge is preferable to no adviser at all.
Thus, it is possible to agree with the premise that consumers need protec-
tion without concluding that giving lawyers an exclusive right to provide
service is a necessary safeguard. =
I am not suggesting that poor people do not deserve competent rep-
resentation, but rather that not every case that comes to court requires an
adviser with the full range of skills possessed by an attorney. A far more
useful approach is to think about ways to expand the universe of poten-
tial counselors to the poor by reducing or eliminating the lawyer's mo-
nopoly in some areas, without compromising important legal rights.
Lawyers are, of course, essential in fully contested trials. In such
cases, legal skills are needed to protect clients, and nonprofessional rep-
resentation would likely result in negative externalities such as efficiency
costs to the tribunal itself or to other litigants.2 Such litigation, however,
represents a relatively small fraction of the legal matters involving the
poor. Many cases are quite routine, and may actually be made more
complex by the overlay of judicial procedures.
There is significant potential for training nonlawyers to manage and
conduct small residential closings, handle uncontested divorces, draw up
18. Accountants, realtors, paralegals, unions and experienced legal secretaries have proven
reliable dispensers of particular kinds of legal advice. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal
Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 209,222-28 (1990). But see Florida Bar v. Fur-
man, 451 So. 2d 808, 815 (Fla. 1984) (finding contempt for violation of court order barring a former
legal secretary from providing oral advice about divorce forms to persons seeking uncontested di-
vorce). Even assistance in court may be effectively carried out by non-lawyers; for instance, in
Vermont, victims' advocates provide emotional support and explain court proceedings in domestic
violence cases.
19. All states prohibit the unauthorized practice of law by persons not admitted to the bar. See
Cramton, supra note 15, at 543.
20. See id. at 545.
21. Some argue that the traditional ethical notions that underlie this kind of protectionist ar-
gument are based on a profession that no longer exists, i.e., the profession no longer comprises the
"19th century tradition of the all-competent generalist lawyer whose clients were almost entirely
private individuals." Id. at 538.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 570-71
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simple wills, probate small estates, negotiate routine personal injury
claims, or collect or defend simple debts.24 To the extent that these mat-
ters require court hearings, they are the sort of cases that could be shifted
from courts of general jurisdiction to court-supervised alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) mechanisms.2' A non-exclusive alternative might be a
procedurally simplified fast-track within the court system for cases within
given subject matter and complexity boundaries.
The opportunities for reducing the formality of the forum and the
level of expertise required to operate in it would be even greater if the
substantive law could likewise be simplified. The law is often complex
because it needs to be. Housing, family and consumer laws-the areas in
which legal assistance so often is needed-are not inherently less com-
plex than other laws because they affect poor people. But even when the
complexities of substantive laws cannot be eliminated, the text of legisla-
tion and regulations may be amenable to simplification and demystifica-
tion. Modern insurance policies written for home and auto owners are
successful examples of moderately complex legal obligations that have
been translated into terms people understand. Similarly, if written deci-
sions are required as a result of alternative dispute mechanisms, opinions
should be designed for lay comprehension.
A break-up of the lawyer monopoly would require corresponding
structural reforms in the judicial system. Innovative court-sponsored
ADR programs may have the most potential for simplifying procedures
and utilizing non-lawyer counselors to provide service to poor people
(and other types of litigants) in appropriate cases. ADR programs al-
ready in existence are gaining increasing acceptance by courts and legisla-
tures. Many programs are designed with other goals in mind, such as im-
proving court efficiency in docket management,2 but they can also be
designed to reduce the overall demand for legal proceedings, and, there-
fore, for lawyers. Counselors will still have to be paid, but presumably
not at the rate it takes to support the modern law practice. Even if lawyer
representation is retained in some non-court proceedings, ADR proce-
24. See JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: THE SOLO PRACrlTIONER IN AN
URBAN SETTING, 206-09 (1994).
25. See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577,580 & n. 3 (1997) (explaining that ADR is an umbrella term
used to describe a number of different mechanisms of dispute resolution, such as arbitration, early
neutral evaluation, fact-finding, mediation, mediationlarbitration, mini-trials, negotiation, om-
budsman, and summary jury trials).
26. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS NORTHEASTERN REGIONAL OFFICE,
MIDDLESEX MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE EVALUATION PROJECr FINAL REPORT (1992)
(reporting findings from court-annexed program designed to screen cases and refer them to the
most appropriate dispute resolution process: case evaluation, mediation, standard arbitration, and
complex case management).
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dures may be more streamlined than court litigation and cost less as a re-
sult.
The challenge is to find a qualitative approach to classifying cases in
the justice system that would incorporate, as an operating principle, the
notion that trial judges and trial lawyers are scarce resources, and that
only those cases requiring their full expertise should be heard in court.27
There is no reason that every cause of action filed in court should be
treated in the same manner. Not all cases merit setting a discovery
schedule, holding status conferences, and pushing counsel toward a trial
date in the hope that the case will actually settle. In other words, court
systems need to spend time figuring out how to handle voluminous non-
complex litigation. Filtering out those cases that could be heard by a dif-
ferent kind of tribunal may be more rewarding than simply pressuring
parties to settle in an ad hoc fashion.
In family law, the area with the most dramatic demand for services,
there is a powerful argument for a substantive change. In Vermont the
family court is overwhelmed with the volume of cases filed, with the
number of pre- and post-judgment proceedings, and with the emotional
crises that plague families in the context of separation and divorce. Lack
of representation for a substantial number of cases exacerbates the
problem beyond resolution within the traditional forum. Family court
judges and staff are barreling toward bum-out because of the frustration
of being unable to solve the myriad problems. A change that would bene-
fit litigants across the board would be a move toward a multi-disciplinary
approach that would remove certain aspects of family cases from the ad-
versarial process. By multi-disciplinary, I mean using other profession-
als-social workers, mediators, psychologists-to handle the difficult
family problems that are not primarily legal and that are not amenable to
27. See id., passim. The Middlesex Multi-Door Courthouse project, which focused on optimiz-
ing the use of attorneys, judges, and court room time, was evaluated for the efficiency of its
screening procedures, cost of procedures, and satisfaction of participants. The evaluation was made
relative to a control group whose cases were processed through the traditional court system. Be-
cause cases processed through the project required fewer attorney hours and less judicial action,
costs were lower, and participants in the project reported a high degree of satisfaction.
28. It is apparent that there are gross inefficiencies in the way the system currently makes use
of precious judge-time. Full-blown trials are held in some divorce cases simply because the litigants
have the means to pay the legal fees required. It is essential to allocate public resources upon crite-
ria that go beyond the desire of litigants.
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a merely legal solution.29 Absent protection and power imbalance con-
cerns, counseling, mediation and administrative hearings may be more
suitable methods of resolving family disputes.
III. CONCLUSION
The provision of adequate legal services to those in need is essential
to the legitimacy of the civil justice system. If the problem of serving the
indigent is not solved, the civil justice system will be seen increasingly as
a publicly funded dispute resolution mechanism for the rich. Traditional
solutions-namely, federally funded legal services programs and pro
bono contributions of lawyers-while important, cannot meet the dra-
matic rise in demand for service.
In my view, the way out of this morass is to recognize that the lack of
legal services for the poor is symptomatic of a deeper problem with our
nation's court system. Our society has outgrown its judicial system.
Nothing short of systemic reform can address these deficiencies. Specific
options include reconfiguring the monopoly lawyers have on the justice
system by reducing the complexity and formality of proceedings where
appropriate. Because the poor are not the only people who are denied
access through lack of representation, the most effective and politically
viable strategy is to combine forces with other groups calling for broad-
based reforms. Much as the health care delivery system has undergone a
sea-change in the past decade, moving away from providing service on
demand and excessive reliance on the most intensively trained service
providers, the crisis of access in the judicial system will force us to recog-
nize the need for systemic reform. The collision of limited resources and
increasing demand compels the invention of a new paradigm for thinking
about both resources and needs. The judicial system must reassess its
purposes with all users in mind and reallocate limited resources according
to priorities that do not shut out the economically disadvantaged.
29. See Patricia G. Barnes, It May Take a Village... or a Specialized Court To Address Family
Problems, 82 A.B.A. J. 22 (Dec. 1996) (observing that domestic relations cases are the fastest
growing segment of state court civil caseloads; accordingly, some states have adopted a unified
court approach in which a judge works on legal issues while social services concerns are handled by
those with expertise in that area); Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering
for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225 (1996) (arguing that traditional legalistic approach
to domestic violence is ineffective and insensitive to the complex circumstances that give rise to
violence in intimate relationships).
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